過去研究指出公司對董監事責任險的需求會受到多項因素影響，然而當中卻鮮少探討審計委員會特性對董監事責任險需求之影響。此外，對於董監事責任險與公司績效間之關聯至今亦無一致之結果。有鑑於此，本研究目的旨在探討公司治理機制中重要的審計委員會，其特性如何影響公司投保董監事責任險之需求，並進一步探討董監事責任險對公司績效所產生的影響。本研究以強制投保法規上路後兩年2019年及2020年臺灣上市櫃公司，共1,530個觀察值進行兩階段迴歸分析。實證結果發現審計委員會規模對董監事責任險投保需求有顯著正向影響；而審計委員會開會次數則對董監事責任險投保需求有顯著負向影響；董監事責任險投保需求對公司績效呈現顯著正向影響，表示投保董監事責任險確實能達到監督作用進而提升企業之績效。爾後，本研究進一步比較電子業與非電子業樣本、自願投保與強制性投保樣本以及家族企業與非家族企業樣本對公司績效之影響是否存在顯著差異。實證結果顯示電子業、自願投保公司與家族企業投保董監事責任險皆對公司績效產生較大影響。

Prior literatures suggest that the demand of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) will be affected by many factors, but the impact of the audit committee characteristics has rarely been discussed. In addition, there has been no consistent result on the correlation between D&O insurance and the firm performance. In view of this, this paper aims to explore how the characteristics of audit committee in the corporate governance mechanism affect the company's demand for D&O insurance, and further explore the impact of D&O insurance on firm performance. This paper conducted a two-stage regression analysis with a total of 1,530 observations for Taiwan listed companies from 2019 to 2020. The empirical results show that the audit committee size has a significant positive impact on the demand of D&O insurance, while the number of the audit committee meetings have a significant negative impact on the demand of D&O insurance, and the demand of D&O insurance shows a significant positive impact on firm performance, indicating that the D&O insurance can indeed achieve a supervisory role and improve the performance of the enterprise. Subsequently, this paper further compares whether there are significant differences in the impact of different grouped samples on firm performance. The empirical results show that the electronics industry, voluntary insurance companies and family business insure D&O insurance all have a greater impact on firm performance.

第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展 7
第三章 研究方法 21
第四章 實證分析 33
第五章 結論 59
參考文獻 63

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